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Rupinder Singh – Juhani Laurila1
Azerbaijan: Recent Economic Developments and Policy
Issues in Sustainability of Growth2
Abstract
The macro economic stabilisation in Azerbaijan has been successful. Following
cessation of conflict with Armenia, and decline of GDP by 60 per cent from 1990
to 1995, the government in effect implemented a big-bang reform process in 1995.
The inflation rate has now declined to the lowest rate of any transition country and
important reforms in the monetary-fiscal mix have been undertaken. The second
plank of first generation reforms, liberalisation, has also been successfully imple-
mented with liberalisation of prices, the trade and foreign exchange regimes and
virtual completion of small-scale privatisation, although the onset of the Russian
crisis in 1998 has impacted negatively both internal and external balances. The
paper presents the current economic picture for Azerbaijan and then assesses eco-
nomic policy issues facing the country.
Azerbaijan is well endowed with natural resources, particularly oil but also
gas. The second part of the paper considers the question by focussing on policy
issues related to the potential flow of oil-based monies into Azerbaijan. The possi-
bility of the “Dutch Disease” syndrome impacting Azerbaijan through a rising real
exchange rate on the non-oil sector is not considered to be a problem at present
but is expected to become a policy concern in the medium- to long term. Struc-
tural reforms in public finance to deal with expected surpluses are lagging and are
necessary in the next phase of the transition of Azerbaijan. Moreover, significant
reforms are required in banking – privatisation, improvement in regulation and su-
pervision and in the implementation of supporting legal rights, given the current
lack of financial intermediation.
Keywords: Azerbaijan, economic development, oil, Dutch Disease, transition
economies
JEL Classification Numbers: E6, P2, P3Institute for Economies in Transition                      6
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1 Introduction
Transition is sometimes referred to as a one-way path. Whatever the country-
specific endogenous mix of policies undertaken to achieve the journey: big
bang, slow reform or some intermediate approach, it presupposes a starting
point and a destination. The historical context is even more relevant for an
understanding of the starting point for Azerbaijan, with exogenous shocks
through both the demise of the Soviet Union and related ruptures to the economy
set within the context of regional ethnic troubles, civil unrest, armed conflict
with neighbouring Armenia and geo-political machinations of regional and glo-
bal powers. These issues are addressed in a complementary paper.3
A further paper examines issues in structural reform, where it is argued
that the developments in the Southern Caucasus4 in general, and in Azerbaijan
in particular, bear interesting evidence of how attractive economic and com-
mercial prospects and expectations can assist to overcome and bring closer
otherwise countries which may be at conflict on the basis of ethnic or territo-
rial claims. Economic and commercial co-operation becomes more attractive
than the politics of isolation and the political compromises more expedient
than the use of power.
At the time of writing, there is a lack of any literature on the Azeri economy
per se and the present set of articles therefore attempts to fill the void. Azerbaijan
receives attention from energy specialists, but the economic issues are typi-
cally addressed under pan-transition outlooks of the multilateral bodies such
as the EBRD and the IMF. Aside from occasional Country Reports by the
IMF or UNDP, there is a dearth of literature on Azerbaijan.5 In relation to the
Economics literature, the paper interlinks with separate works. The first is the
literature that relates to countries heavily endowed with natural resources which
can lead to macroeconomic instability, particularly through overvaluation of
the real exchange rate (Buiter and Purvis, 1983 and Eastwood; Venebles,
1982 and Rosenberg and Saavalainen, 1998) and more recent analysis into the
formation of power-clans (Tornell and Lane 1998). The second link is to the
literature on equilibrium exchange rates for transition countries (Halpern and
Wyplosz, 1996; Krajnyák and Zettelmeyer, 1997). The unifying theme for
both in the context of Azerbaijan is the large endowment of oil and gas and the
impact on the real sector through a possible rise in the real exchange rate.
Post-Soviet Azerbaijan has undergone a relatively fast reform process since
1995 and has successfully undertaken first-generation reforms towards a mar-
ket setting. Following cessation of conflict with Armenia, and decline of GDPInstitute for Economies in Transition                      8
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by 60 per cent from 1990 to 1995, the government in effect implemented a
big-bang reform process. The paper presents the current economic picture for
Azerbaijan and then assesses the policy issues for the pursuit of necessary
second-generation reforms in the transition process. The second plank of first
generation reforms, liberalisation, has also been successfully implemented with
liberalisation of prices, the trade and foreign exchange regimes and virtual
completion of small-scale privatisation. 6 However, the onset of the Russian
crisis in 1998 has impacted negatively both internal and external balances.
The second plank of first generation reforms, liberalisation, has also been
successfully implemented with liberalisation of prices, trade regime, foreign
exchange regime as well as completion of small-scale privatisation.
The present paper is organised in two parts: section I sets out recent eco-
nomic developments and section II assesses policy concerns for sustainable
economic growth in the medium- to long-term.
The overall positive trends in economic reform since 1995 were perturbed
by the impact of two external shocks in 1998, the decline of oil prices and the
onset of the Russian crisis in H2 1998. Both shocks led to a worsening of both
internal and external balances. The non-oil current account deficit was ex-
pected to worsen in H2 1998 as Azeri non-oil products came under competi-
tive pressure from Russian goods, both in domestic and external markets,
leading to a fall in exports and a rise in imports.
However, the basic macro-picture remains relatively sanguine. The spec-
tre of inflation has been overcome and the country recorded the lowest annual
inflation rates in transition countries in the years 1997 and 1998, of 4per cent
and deflation of 8 per cent respectively. GDP is and expected to grow at above
6 per cent per annum for the next few years. The rapid expansion from 1996
has been on the back of significant inflows of FDI related to the oil-industry,
and which has translated into high rates of investment. The decline in indus-
trial production halted in 1996 following a cumulative recorded drop of 55.7
per cent from 1990. However, official statistics over-report the drop, as pri-
vate sector activity is not adequately captured.7 With sound monetary and
fiscal stances and low inflation, real incomes have risen, leading to a rise in
private consumption.
One question of policy concern is the exchange rate stance that Azerbaijan
should adopt. Nominal stability during 1998 has been attained though use of
central bank reserves – an unsustainable policy. A broader policy concern is
for the long-term tendency of the real exchange rate. One conclusion of the
paper is that for Azerbaijan, the possibility of the “Dutch Disease” syndromeInstitute for Economies in Transition                      9
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through a rising real exchange rate on the non-oil sector is not a problem
today but may became one in the medium- to long-term.
Secondly, state revenues are highly leveraged on oil exports. The decline
in world oil prices during 1998 and strengthens the argument for faster struc-
tural reforms in public finance to improve transparency and improve both
collection and management of state funds and that are necessary to ensure
balanced growth over time, particularly as oil revenues rise beyond 2003.
One reason for the low inflation rate in Azerbaijan has been the low level
of credit creation. The third conclusion of the paper is that the financial inter-
mediation process is not operating efficiently due to both demand and supply-
side constraints. An efficient financial intermediation process is necessary to
direct excess savings to investible projects on market terms as well, in the case
of Azerbaijan, to expand the provision of banking to areas outside the capital
of Baku, currently at the expense of other regions and sectors, particularly
agriculture. Significant reforms are required in banking – privatisation, im-
provement in regulation and supervision and in the implementation of support-
ing legal rights, particularly in order for the intermediation of credit to the real
sector.
2 Recent Economic Developments
Introduction
Azerbaijan became an independent state on October 1991, following the dis-
solution of the USSR. The Azeri economy, geared to the demands of the
Soviet GOSPLAN and part of CMEA, faced external shocks with the demise
of these structures, and by the onset of regional conflict over Nagorno–
Karabakh. The break-up of trading links and payment mechanisms within the
CMEA bloc, and more particularly within the Soviet Union was exacerbated
by deterioration in the terms of trade for Azerbaijan as formerly planned econo-
mies began to move towards transition at different speeds and with different
rates of price adjustment.Institute for Economies in Transition                      10
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Table 1: Key Economic Indicators
Source: ASSC, Azerbaijan Economic Trends, EBRD Transition Report 1998 and
PlanEcon.
1. In per cent of GDP
2. USDm, year-end, excluding gold
3. Labour data are taken from EBRD and are significantly different from offi-
cial data that gives the unemployment rate at under 2 per cent of the Labour
Force. The EBRD Labour Force data here are corrected for the working age
population outside the Labour force whilst unemployment figures are based
on survey data.
The Azerbaijani authorities began a committed stabilisation programme in 1995,
thus condensing the reform process, which had been smoother in some other
transition countries. Prior to 1995, the contraction of the economy was ac-
companied by a reduction in real incomes, the latter due to hyperinflation.8
High rates of domestic inflation in the period were due both to the release of
the monetary overhang and to the pursuit of loose monetary and fiscal poli-
cies.
These changes led to significant shift in economic indicators from 1995, as
shown in Table 1. During the years 1992–1994 economic activity as measured
by GDP declined by more than 52 per cent  (Table 1 and Figure 1).9 In 1995
the decline slowed and in 1996 output increased by 1.3 per cent, the first
recorded rise since 1990, and has since accelerated. GDP per capita started to
decline year-by-year from 1991, bottomed at USD 173 in 1994 and has since
risen annually to USD 599 in 1998 (see Figure 1).
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP  -0,7 -22,6 -23,1 -19,7 -11,8 1,3 5,8 8,0
Industrial Gross Output -8,9 -30,4 -19,7 -22,7 -17,2 -6,7 0,3 2
Agricultural Gross Output -2,6 -25,0 -16,3 -13,0 -6,8 3,0 -6,9 5,6
Inflation (end of period) 126 1395,0 1294,0 1788,0 84,5 6,5 4,0 -0,8
General Government Balance
1 .. .. -15,3 -12,1 -4,9 -2,8 -1,7 -4,0
External Current Account
1 .. .. .. -9,2 -13,2 -25,5 -23,7 -29,5
Gross Official Reserves
2 .. 0,0 0,0 2,0 119,0 214,0 467,0 432,0
Exchange rate (end of period) .. 45,0 238,0 4330,0 4440,0 4098,0 3888,0 3860,0
Reserve Money Growth .. .. .. .. .. 17,7 35,1 -21,0
Broad Money Growth .. .. 821,0 1184,0 24,0 18,9 14,3 13,1
Labour Force
3 .. .. 0,5 -3,1 1,6 5,1 0,2 ..
Unemployment Rate
3
15,4 16,0 15,2 17,0 19,4 19,3 ..Institute for Economies in Transition                      11
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Stabilisation
In 1995 the Azeri authorities undertook an IMF-backed stabilisation plan.
Both monetary and fiscal policies were tightened. These led to a sharp reduc-
tion in domestic inflation to 84,5 per cent in 1995, to 4 per cent in 1997 and
deflation of 0.8 per cent in 1998, down from 1788 per cent in 1994. Price
stability has been achieved against a backdrop of upward adjustment in do-
mestic utility prices, which were previously subsidised, and which for other
transition countries have seen inflation inertia. Further structural reforms in
the form of liberalisation of the exchange rate mechanism and of the trade
regime have helped improve the position of the Azeri economy and correct the
mis-allocation of prices and incentives.
The start of the stabilisation process was possible following the cessation
of conflict with neighbouring Armenia. Whilst price liberalisation had in fact
started in 1992, the necessary conditions of political stability and political con-
sensus for successful stabilisation and liberalisation were lacking.10
To 1998, monetary policy has been geared toward reducing inflation and
been moderately tight, with financing to the government eliminated. However,
as highlighted later, the lack of structural reforms in banking and the creation
of supporting reforms have led to an overly tight monetary stance, evidenced
by the very low money-multiplier.
The manat, introduced as legal tender in 1994 has stabilised against the
USD and in fact appreciated during 1997–98 in nominal and real terms against
both the USD and on a trade-weighted basis. The stability and appreciation of
the manat has been largely due to the inflow of FDI related to the oil-sector in
Azerbaijan and spillovers into the non-tradable sectors such as construction
and services. The country is endowed with significant oil and gas deposits and
which policy-makers are hoping to develop and use as a platform for strong
and sustainable economic growth.
The rise in both the nominal and real exchange rates against the USD have
led to concerns about possible over-shooting, and is an issue that is addressed
in Section II. The external current account deficit worsened from 9 per cent of
GDP in 1994 to 24 per cent of GDP in 1997. However, oil-related imports of
goods and services have been behind the evident deterioration. With inflows
on the capital account, the overall Balance of Payments recorded a surplus ofInstitute for Economies in Transition                      12
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USD 0.5bn in 1997, matched on the financing by a rise in reserve holdings of
the central bank. The deficit grew to 29.5 per cent of GDP for 1998 because
of a reduction in oil earnings following the decline in oil prices and a rise in
imports following the significant the Russian crisis. Moreover, investment flows
into the oil industry fell short of expectations, as oil companies pulled back
investment plans following the decline in oil prices. The result was a small
deficit on the Balance of Payments and a matching decline in reserves.
The contagion impacted money demand for the manat, and, with FDI
inflows lower than expected during 1998, the central bank maintained a stable
rate through intervention. This policy of depleting currency reserves is not
sustainable, and a more flexible exchange rate stance is likely in 1999.
The decline in oil prices led to lower than planned revenues in 1998,
expected at 17 percent of GDP in comparison to 19per cent in 1997. The
fiscal position relaxed in H2 1998 as Expenditures accelerated before the Presi-
dential election in October, and the deficit was 4per cent of GDP. Overall, the
fiscal stance has in recent years tightened, especially on a cash-basis and a
number of reforms are being introduced to improve both the revenue and
expenditure sides, through introduction of a Tax Code, improved tax collec-
tion, greater transparency in expenditures through in particular the establish-
ment of a Treasury function. However, revenue collection remains a problem,
and particularly the imposition of a hard budget constraint for arrears and non-
payment.
The privatisation process began in 1996. Small-scale privation of 16,331
enterprises was completed by April 1998. The private sector now accounts for
51 per cent of GDP, although as much as 60 per cent of GDP may not be
accurately reported or reflected in economic statistics.Institute for Economies in Transition                      13
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2.1 Growth in Azerbaijan, 1990 –1998
Figure 1:  Azerbaijani GDP
Real GDP rose 10 per cent in 1998, following the 5.8 per cent rise recorded in
1997. Nominal GDP in 1998 was almost trn 16 manat or USD4.1 bn, making
it one of the biggest of the relatively small former Soviet successor states with
the exception of Lithuania, which has an economy roughly double the size.
Since 1990 important structural changes have occurred (see Figure 2).
The significant decline in output has meant that the “size of the economic
cake” has declined. But within the reduced cake, the composition of sectoral
output has too changed.  At current prices, the share of total industry declined
from 29 per cent in 1992 to 22 per cent in 1998. But at the same time,
industrial production in volume terms decreased by about 72 per cent in com-
parison to 1990 and 55 per cent since 1992, i.e. by more than the decline in
GDP, which declined by 42 per cent over the same period.
The share of agriculture fell from 26 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 20 per
cent in 1997, following the high-point of 32 per cent share in 1994. However,
gross agricultural output was 51 per cent below that in 1990 and 35 per cent
below the level in 1992. The decline in agriculture has been due in part to
deterioration in agricultural machinery, fertilisers, irrigation systems, lack of
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commercial marketing and wholesale structures to replace the Soviet plan-
ning norms as well as lack of financing for replacing equipment.11 In 1998,
Gross Agricultural Output declined by 6.9 per cent  due also to the adverse
weather conditions, but is expected to have rebounded by 5 per cent in 1998,
though the share of agriculture in GDP remained constant at 20%.
The share of construction in GDP has risen from 7 per cent in 1992 to 16
per cent in 1998. In physical output, the level of construction fell dramatically
during the first half of the 1990s, reaching the low-point in 1995 when it was
only 10per cent of the 1990 level. However, construction activity has acceler-
ated since 1995, related to the both oil-related construction and spillovers into
building of hotels, offices and housing units and has become the fastest grow-
ing component of GDP, though from a low base, and is expected to continue
at near double-digit annual growth rates during the next few years.
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Transport and communications have increased their sectoral share since
1995. The volume of freight was up 14 per cent and is expected to show a
further 6 per cent rise for 1998. At a crossroads between the East, the West,
the CIS markets to the north and the Arab countries to the south, this sector is
expected to show significant growth over the next decade. The EU funded
TRACECA programme is seeking to open transport corridor along the former
Silk Route for this very purpose, while Azerbaijan has an existing infrastruc-
ture for transport into Russia to the north.  The rise in the sector will therefore
be based on two factors: the transport of Caspian oil, either north to Russia or
to the west, and; secondly, transit of traffic, inclusive of import-export opera-
tions undertaken by Azeri economic agents. The transport and communica-
tions sector is therefore expected to increase annually by double-digit rates
for the next decade.
The trade sector has risen in importance although it is not evident from
official statistics. The trade sector has grown since 1996, though from a low
base, recording growth rates of 14 per cent and 17 per cent for 1996 and 1997
and expected 7 per cent for 1998, though the share of the sector in GDP has
remained relatively constant at 6 per cent in 1998. However, the private sec-
tor and the trade sector in particular are very much outside official statistics
and part of the shadow economy. This implies that the share of trade in GDP
and its growth rate are under-represented.
2.2  Production: Oil and Gas
Figure 3 shows the output trends for oil production in Azerbaijan. Annual
Crude oil production in Azerbaijan in 1998 at 11.4m barrels was the highest
since 1991. The depletion of equipment and poor maintenance of existing
fields, which constrained production, explain the decline in the interim. The
arrival of foreign oil companies led to development of offshore oil and intro-
duction of efficient technologies, and which accounted in 1998 for 85 per cent
of total annual output. However, offshore production of oil has yet to take off
at the levels earlier forecast.Institute for Economies in Transition                      16
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Source: ASSC.
Figure 3: Production of Oil
Figure 4 shows trends for output of gas. Annual output of gas declined
annually following the dissolution of the USSR, and in 1998 was 76 per
cent lower than in 1990 at 5.3-m cubic metres. The decline has been due
both due to both the inefficiencies of the distribution system and due to a
decline in recorded reserves of gas. However, during 1998, new gas
reserves were found offshore, and these reserves present a future source
of earnings, although at present there is no infrastructure to produce and
distribute this source. Nonetheless, gas production has begun to improve,
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Figure 4: Production of  Gas
.
Source: ASSC.
2.3 The Non Oil Sector
Table 2 displays time series for real industrial production and annual real
changes by sector. To 1997, total industrial production declined by 55.6 per
cent from 1992. In 1996 the decline in real industrial production bottomed out,
and in 1997 registered a small rise of 0.2 per cent.
Table 2: Industrial Decline (1992 = 100)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total Industry 100 80,3 60,4 47,5 44,3 44,4 45,3
Energy 100 89,0 82,8 76,1 74,4 73,2 ..
Metallurgy 100 61,3 16,2 8,6 2,1 9,7 4,9
Machine Building 100 85,6 46,1 25,0 20,5 20,4 14,3
Chemical and petro-chemical 100 72,3 43,8 37,2 46,5 33,4 29,7
Construction materials 100 65,8 45,9 17,0 16,3 15,6 13,7
Light Industry 100 85,3 61,2 54 32,1 26,8 15,5
Textiles 100 88 58,1 53,4 31,8 27,4 24,2
Agroprocessing 100 72,7 47 25,8 16,8 15,7 15,4
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Traditionally, the non Oil-Industry was dominated by heavy industries like
metallurgy, machinery, and chemical industry and construction materials. Since
1990, by physical quantity the decline of theses industries has been spectacu-
lar.  Physical production in 1998 was approximately 5 to 10 per cent of their
1990 level.
Electricity production declined by 43 per cent in physical terms from 1990
to 1997. However, the share of electricity production in total industrial pro-
duction increased from 4 per cent in 1990 to 14.1 per cent in 1997.
The decline of light industry measures 83 per cent in physical quantity
since 1990. The sharp decline in demand from former closed markets of the
CMEA bloc, the rises in industry terms-of-trade following the upward adjust-
ment of formerly repressed prices and faced against better quality goods from
western producers are factors that explain the sharp decline. Industry rates of
utilisation may be low in nominal terms, suggesting that in areas of compara-
tive advantage, Azerbaijan may be able to restructure some enterprises and
attract investment into these firms. However, to the extent that excess capac-
ity includes redundant production lines, the full or part-time operation of these
lines is a waste of economic resources. This has a cost to economic policy –
higher excess capacity would suggest that the production possibility frontier
for the economy is higher, or the output gap is larger. However, if excess
capacity is over-valued then the output gap and the implied adjustment of the
real sector may call for modified economic policies on the supply side.
The contraction in industry halted in 1997, when the sector grew margin-
ally by 0.2 per cent, following the accumulated drop of 87 per cent to 1996.
The bottoming-out in 1997 was on the back of 0.1 per cent rise in oil and gas
and an extraordinary 362 per cent rise in metallurgy.  All the main industrial
sectors have declined per year to 1996, with the exception Chemicals and
petrochemicals, which rose by 25 per cent before declining by 28 per cent in
1997.
2.4  Agriculture
The volume of agricultural output declined by 40 per cent between 1992 and
1995. Developments for individual crops are given in Table 3. One of the
main factors explaining this decline was government pricing and procurement
policies during this period, which have been reinforced by the break-up of the
traditional links and partial loss of the captive markets in Russia because ofInstitute for Economies in Transition                      19
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deterioration of transport communication between Azerbaijan and Russia via
the North Caucasus. The liberalisation of input prices and the system of com-
pulsory deliveries to the state at low prices imposed too strong a pressure on
profitability of the sector. Since 1995 reforms have been introduced.  Domes-
tic prices of wheat and cotton have been raised to near the world market
levels in 1996. Privatisation has continued to progress slowly, the share of the
private sector in the agricultural production rising from 39 per cent in 1990 to
67 per cent in 1995 and 74 per cent in 1997. The small recovery of the agri-
cultural sector in 1996 may have been explained in part by changes in owner-
ship structure, but also may have been influenced by other factors such as
improved access to information about prices and distribution, although still
very much nascent.
 Table 3: Indices for Agricultural Production (1990 = 100)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
cereals 100,0 95,2 94,6 81,2 73,5 65,2 72,0 79,7 67,0
cotton 100,0 99,4 61,9 52,4 52,3 50,5 50,5 23,0 20,7
tobacco 100,0 108,3 98,9 84,9 39,3 22,1 21,2 28,5 28,7
potatoes 100,0 97,1 84,2 82,2 81,2 84,0 115,9 120,6 167,4
vegetables 100,0 94,1 64,8 57,0 56,4 49,5 66,6 57,8 58,7
grapes 100,0 94,1 50,7 34,4 26,2 25,8 23,0 12,1 12,0
tea 100,0 87,0 74,0 78,0 63,0 31,0 9,8 5,2 2,9
meat 100,0 87,4 64,2 52,7 48,1 46,7 48,8 51,6 54,0
milk 100,0 97,7 87,6 82,3 80,8 85,2 86,9 90,8 95,2
eggs 100,0 97,2 82,4 59,3 50,1 46,3 48,4 49,9 51,5
wool 100,0 93,8 84,8 86,6 79,5 80,4 81,3 85,3 88,4
silk cocoons 100,0 120,4 106,9 65,3 30,6 22,4 16,3 8,2 2,0
Growth rates
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
cereals -4,8 -0,6 -14,2 -9,5 -11,3 10,4 10,7 -15,9
cotton -0,6 -37,7 -15,3 -0,2 -3,4 0,0 -54,5 -10,0
tobacco 8,3 -8,7 -14,2 -53,7 -43,8 -4,1 34,4 0,7
potatoes -2,9 -13,3 -2,4 -1,2 3,4 38,0 4,1 38,8
vegetables -5,9 -31,1 -12,0 -1,1 -12,2 34,5 -13,2 1,6
grapes -5,9 -46,1 -32,1 -23,8 -1,5 -10,9 -47,4 -0,8
tea -13,0 -14,9 5,4 -19,2 -50,8 -68,4 -46,9 -44,2
meat -12,6 -26,5 -17,9 -8,7 -2,9 4,5 5,7 4,7
milk -2,3 -10,3 -6,1 -1,8 5,4 2,0 4,5 4,8
eggs -2,8 -15,2 -28,0 -15,5 -7,6 4,5 3,1 3,2
wool -6,2 -9,6 2,1 -8,2 1,1 1,1 4,9 3,6
silk cocoons 20,4 -11,2 -38,9 -53,1 -26,8 -27,2 -49,7 -75,6
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Real agriculture rose by 3.1 per cent in 1996, following the 29.3 per cent
decline from 1992 before declining by a further 6.9 per cent in 1997. The
latter decline was on the back of a 55 per cent decline in cotton production in
1997.
2.5 External Trade
Figures 5 and 6 show the changing structure of trade in exports and imports.
In 1992 exports to CIS represented 49.2 per cent of total exports, of which
23.4 per cent was to Russia and 9.2 per cent was to Ukraine. In 1997 Russia
remained the main trading partner with 23.1 per cent of Azeri exports, but the
second trading partner became Georgia with 17.1 per cent of total Azeri
exports, whilst Turkey and Iran continue to be major trading partners. The
decline in exports to the EU may simply be due to transit via third-countries,
through “other” countries.
Figure 5: Direction of Exports
Source: Author’s calculations on data provided by ASSC.
Medium-term trend in the trade-sector is likely to see greater commercial
activity with neighbouring Caucus and regional economies at the expense of
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Russia and Ukraine but greater trade with Georgia, Turkey, and Iran and
perhaps in the long-term even with Armenia. Two additional factors are likely
to lead to a reduction in trade with Russia. Firstly, the development of oil
exports with greater use of non-Russian delivery routes is likely to imply both
larger export volumes and percentage of exports redirected toward the final
destination of EU markets, and also of Kazakhstani oil transited. Secondly,
the impact of the Russian crisis in 1998 is likely to speed up the export re-
orientation away from Russia, particularly as the Azeri non-oil sector develops
commercially and begins to shun barter solutions favoured by Russian entities.
Figure 6: Direction of Imports
Source: Author’s calculations on data provided by ASSC.
A noticeable shift in import structure has been observed since 1992 with the
share of import to CIS countries reducing from 64.6 per cent in 1992 to 44.2
per cent in 1997. This is offset by an increase of imports from other countries
such as Turkey, Iran and United Arab Emirates, from 24.1 per cent in 1992 to
42.9 per cent in 1997. Trade and import statistics in particular are not com-
pletely reliable due to problems of registering and governance at the Customs
Office, something recognised by Azeri authorities. Azerbaijan has a dynamic
import-export sector based on importing goods from Turkey, Pakistan and
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domestic consumption of goods, particularly tobacco, misspecification of im-
ports is higher then for exports. This means that the true re-orientation of
imports from the CIS and particularly Russia is in fact likely to be even more
pronounced than indicated by Figure 6.
Figure 7: Trade and Current Account Balances (per cent of GDP)
Source: ASCC.
Figure 8 shows trends on the external account. Deficits on the current ac-
count have exceeded 15 per cent of GDP since 1994 and measured 23.8 per
cent for 1997 and are expected to be of the same magnitude for 1998. How-
ever, oil consortiums have accounted for approximately half of the deficit
through imports related to investments in the oil industry. Thus as shown in
Figure 8, the headline deficit on the current account is indeed sustainable,
since it has been financed through inflows on the capital account, particularly
through FDI, the latter exhibited in Figure 9. Moreover, it is expected that
with the completion of investment into the oil sector, oil-sector based deficit
will decline along with compensating item on the capital account, but the
onset of oil exports will lead to a balanced current account and then surpluses
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Figure 8: Current Account Balances (per cent of GDP)
Source: ASSC.
Figure 9: FDI into Azerbaijan
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2.6  Monetary Stance
As part of the stabilisation package, monetary policy was tightened. How-
ever, in hindsight, monetary policy was excessively tight due to constraints on
the intermediation function, which limited the money multiplier. Since 1996,
real interest rates have remained relatively high at the level of 15–20 per
cent.  The manat strengthened and the pace of inflation slowed down in 1997.
Therefore the NBA decided that it could afford the monetary aggregates
grow more than it had planned, not offsetting the large capital and financial
flows from abroad. Due to these heavy capital inflows net international re-
serves also grew rapidly and gross reserves reached to the level of four
months’ imports. Although the banking system still needed to improve its li-
quidity by resorting to borrowing from the NBA, lending by the NBA to the
Government was less than expected. Subsequently, net domestic assets of
the NBA also reduced from AZM 807 billion in the beginning of 1997 to AZM
648 billion at the end of 1997.
Monetary conditions tightened in the beginning of 1998. Due to the fall of
oil prices the foreign exchange proceeds from oil-related activities diminished.
The NBA intervened to support the manat and net international reserves de-
clined. The resultant decline in Net Foreign Assets was not matched by a rise
in Net Domestic Assets, and the result was a reduction in reserve money.
Moreover, central government and commercial banks made lower than ex-
pected recourse to central bank financing. This implied that manat broad money
fell as the manat multiplier declined reflecting the worsened financial situation
of banks (see Figure 10). The refinance interest rates of the NBA have stayed
since the mid-1996 fairly stable. The nominal rate came down from 34 to 13
per cent during 1997 but began to rise in 1998 once the monetary conditions
tightened. Annual interest on bank loans was in mid-1998 about 20 per cent.
Given the close zero rate inflation the real interest rate for potential borrowers
were prohibitively high.
In principle, Azerbaijan maintains a flexible exchange regime. However, in
practice, exchange rate stability has been a major policy goal to 1998 and the
NBA has used substantial reserves to prop up the manat, particularly in H2
1998, when there was a move to dollarisation following the Russian Crisis.
One policy issue is whether the exchange rate should be allowed to devalue
and this issue is discussed in section 6. The official rate of exchange is deter-
mined by auctions in the Baku Interbank Currency Exchange (BICEX). Manat
can be purchased and sold against major currencies (USD, DEM and RBL)Institute for Economies in Transition                      25
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The manat is the only NIS currency for which the nominal exchange rate has
strengthened against the US dollar monotonously from 1995 to 1998. The
nominal exchange rate of the manat has been appreciating 8 per cent in 1996,
5 per cent in 1997 and about 1 per cent 1998. The monetary authorities
continued their policy of limited intervention in the foreign exchange market.
The nominal appreciation of Manat has been supported by actual and
expected inflow of foreign exchange through the FDI, proceeds from oil sector
taxation, oil signature bonuses and production sharing mechanisms. This nominal
appreciation has not been reflected by a corresponding decline of the domestic
inflation because of the downward rigid prices of imported goods that pres-
ently dominate to consumer and also investment goods markets.
freely in numerous local foreign exchange boots and banks.
Figure 10: Manat Money Multiplier and Linear Trend Line (1996–98)
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2.7 Fiscal Stance
Tight fiscal policy has been an essential part of macroeconomic stabilisation.
In 1997 the fiscal deficit was 1.7 per cent of the GDP on a cash-basis, having
been more than 15 per cent of the GDP in 1993. Total revenues amounted to
17 per cent of the GDP. Direct taxes have become the most important source
of revenue: corporate profit tax, income tax for physical persons and social
security contributions amount to 7.6 per cent of the GDP. The increase of
revenues from these sources is related to the increased economic activity and
higher average wages.
Figure 11: General Government (per cent of GDP)
Source: ASSC.
Revenues from indirect taxes (VAT, excises and customs duties) have increased
to 7.2 per cent of the GDP. The increase is due to broadening the VAT tax
base by removing exemptions and duty free threshold for imported goods for
personal use. Royalties from the oil sector, item introduced at the end of 1995,
amount to 2.2 per cent of the GDP in 1997. The revenues from property taxes
and from other sources were 2.7 per cent of the GDP.
The two major expenditure items, 12.2 per cent in 1997, continue to be
wages and salaries as well as purchases of goods and services. The public
sector, including the central and local government as well as the state enter-
prises but excluding army, employs almost 1.5 million persons, while the total
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increases of from 20 to 40 per cent the average public wage is only two thirds
of the national average.
Figure 11 shows the position for the consolidated budget, including net
lending. The fiscal balance declined from 4.3 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 1.7
per cent in 1997. At the time of writing, the drop in world oil prices impacted
forecasts for revenues and the budget deficit was expected to exceed 2 per
cent of GDP for 1998 and 4per cent of GDP on a consolidated basis.
In the fiscal area, a significant policy issue is based on the uncertainties on
both the volume and timing of the future flow of oil revenues (front-end
payments, royalties, and excises on existing oil production) because of the
fluctuations of oil prices or that they often accrue as bullet payments. One
implication of this is that this may lead to over optimistic budgeting, possibly
to be financed through inflationary means in case of non-receipt of the ex-
pected oil revenues.13
As mentioned above, royalties and other bonuses financed the state budget
deficit paid by oil companies on investment deals. The Azerbaijan government
will receive about 25 per cent of the oil revenues, equivalent to 70–80 per cent
of oil profits while foreign companies will get 20´–30 per cent depending on
market fluctuations. Azerbaijan’s receipts from the petroleum sector will de-
rive mainly from royalties and excises on ongoing oil production. From the
beginning of 2005 Azerbaijan expects to receive USD 5 billion a year hard
currency revenues generated by the sales of oil from the Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli
project14. Another source has been the receipts from sales of the Govern-
ment Bonds (“Public Short-term obligations, PTSO’s). The receipts from the
199 auctions in 1997 were 169 billion AZM.
3 Sustainable Economic Growth
Introduction
Having considered trends in recent economic developments, we now turn
attention to economic policy issues facing Azerbaijan. In particular, the inter-
est is on qualitative growth over the medium- to long-term. To this end, the
discovery of oil presents additional complexities to reform for a country in the
midst of transition from a planned to a market setting, creating specific chal-
lenges to macro-management.Institute for Economies in Transition                      28
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Unsustainable economic growth over the medium- to long-term is typi-
cally due to a bad mix and design of policy and for commodity-endowed
economies there is evidence of boom-and-bust economic growth.15,16 Many
features of the bad economic growth are currently visible in Azerbaijan, not
yet as a result of growth, partly as a legacy of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Azerbaijan inherited a top-heavy industrial sector, geared to the demands of
the Soviet Plan. Predominant industries – oil, chemical, iron, steel and agro-
industries are highly capital-intensive and not sustainable in a market setting
and in the main have been or will be closed. A significant policy concern
therefore is to ensure that the growth translates into transition in the labour
market, with excess labour moving from dying enterprises to new sectors. The
potential cost of an inappropriate policy response would otherwise be a rise in
the effective unemployment rate, increasing skewness of distributions of in-
come and wealth between different social groups and regions and therefore be
qualified as “bad”.17
The Azeri government has addressed this issue through successfully pri-
vatising small-scale operations, in the main to existing managers. Moreover,
the liberalisation of the trade regime has allowed a significant growth in private
sector activity, in particular through import-export trade activity, itself not yet
fully captured by official statistics. However, whilst these policy responses
have been necessary in the first generation of reforms, they have not been
sufficient to tackle the employment issue. Azerbaijan now finds itself in the
throes of second-generation reforms and where difficult decisions are re-
quired to either close some of the existing large enterprises, or to privatise
viable enterprises. The difficulties arise from the lack of either supporting
institutional reforms to complement the move to market norms such as effec-
tive bankruptcy proceedings and existence of legal rights or from the lack of
necessary political support because of vested interests.18
The seeds for the other type of the malign growth already exist in
Azerbaijan. Income distribution has become highly skewed, with concentra-
tion in a narrow circle. This dualism exists also regionally and manifests itself
as a growing gap of wealth and income between the metropolis of Baku and
the rest of the country. The 850,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), mainly
farmers and their families from the occupied territory living in the camps,
railway wagons and dog-holes, aggravate the situation. For political reasons
the Azerbaijani government is not willing to support the IDPs to settle down
where they currently live.Institute for Economies in Transition                      29
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The very dynamic grey economy, corruption and underdeveloped social
safety net also nourish the ruthless growth. Ultimately all this is based also on
“voiceless growth” where the economy grows but a vast majority of popula-
tion is without power, or democracy, to essentially resist the unequal eco-
nomic and social developments. The well to do political power elite of Azerbaijan
does not seem to be – for the time being – mature enough to reduce corruption
and to introduce economic discipline necessary for civil society and enhanced
social policy, and ultimately sustainable and equitable economic growth.
Outside political-economy considerations assessed in the complementary
paper, purely economic policy issues arise from expectations of significant
monies arising from the oil deposits in Azerbaijan. Economic forecasts about
expected rapid growth rest on assumptions about the volume and price of the
crude and gas excavated and transported from Caspian Sea to the world mar-
ket. The substantial amounts of commitments serve as token of the serious-
ness or the intentions of the oil consortia. However, should exploration reveal
oil reserves to be lower or contain more gas than oil, expected growth figures
would have to be modified downward.
The implementation of the macro-economic stabilisation program launched
in 1995 has been successful. GDP growth is strong and the rate of inflation
low. With prospects for rapidly accruing oil revenues, the toughest challenge
for Azerbaijan will be the acceleration of transition process in productive non-
oil sectors so as to avoid narrow oil-based economy with virtually total ab-
sence of all domestic production and deepening the regionally and socially
dualistic economy. Is Azerbaijan receiving too much and too fast external
finance in order to be ready to develop a balanced and sustainable growth
based on market principles and democracy?
We attempt to answer this question by considering the expected impact of
the oil sector on non-oil sectors and on regional policy through the expected
rise in the real exchange rate and the onset of the Dutch Disease syndrome,
related policy issues in public finance arising from the oil premium, the
interlinkages between the real and financial sectors through projections of the
impact of the oil premium on investment and saving and supporting banking
and structural reforms to improve the financial intermediating process.
3.1 The “Dutch Disease”
 The “Dutch Disease” syndrome19 is one where rapid economic growth of the
oil and gas sector may potentially have adverse effects on the overall eco-Institute for Economies in Transition                      30
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nomic growth of Azerbaijan through impact on non-oil sectors, crowding out
of financial and intellectual resources and impact regional policy outside the
oil-rich Absheron peninsula.
The central focus of interest in the “Dutch Disease” approach is the ex-
pectation of an appreciating domestic currency, which favours imports and
makes investments in export promoting and import substituting investments
unattractive. Related macro-management issues relate to firstly monetary policy,
which is geared at inflation-targets but may need to be accommodative to
prevent overshooting of the exchange rate. On the other hand, if the credibility
of the stabilisation program was weak and inflow of foreign currencies is
particularly strong, sterilisation may be necessary to avoid excessive increases
of money supply, itself a short-term solution.20 Secondly, in the context of
commodity-based financial flows, fiscal policy needs to be both managed and
co-ordinated with the monetary stance to define an appropriate mix.
The monetary approach has a real sector variant. A real exchange rate that
appreciates too rapidly may impede the development of the non-oil sector. An
excessively tight monetary stance may lead to overshooting of the domestic
currency and lead to investment in non-tradables. The rise in the relative price
of non-tradables to tradables equates to a rise in the real exchange rate. The
latter could thereby impact structural reform, particularly in a transition con-
text – financial intermediation will be attracted to the non-tradable sector, and
away from where there are both missing financial and commercial links, such
as in agriculture. Moreover, given the concentration of recorded Azeri GDP
in the Absheron peninsula and where Baku is sited of over 70per cent, the
redirection of resources toward the non-tradable sector will be, as has been
the trend since 1995, based in this area. This impacts regional policy, and the
rising real exchange rate in Azerbaijan is therefore likely to have a relatively
more severe impact the non-Azeri tradable sector.
Studies and models on the Dutch-disease in general assume firstly a mar-
ket setting and secondly some notion of equilibrium real exchange rates (RER).21
With respect to the first point, Azerbaijan is still very much a transition coun-
try, and lacks a fully functioning market system. With respect to the second
point, Azerbaijan like a number of other former planned economies began
transition with an undervalued real exchange rate. The latter is particularly so
since, prior to the transition process, the RER was administratively set at an
artificially high level through controls on domestic prices and access to foreign
currency assets, including currency. Upon liberalisation, a sudden and sharp
decline of the RER took place. Inflationary pressures combined with the flightInstitute for Economies in Transition                      31
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to foreign assets led to a fall of the RER. The latter was in the context of
sluggish adjustment of goods prices in relation to asset prices.
Recent work has shown that as transition unfolds, the degree of under-
valuation of the RER declines against some notional equilibrium (which too
may of course vary).22 This may be due to a number of factors:
1. Prices of public utilities (rents, transport, better financial disci
pline) are gradually adjusted to cost-pricing;
2. Possible high returns on capital investment attract capital inflow
into sectors of  comparative international advantage;
3. Pent-up demand pressures raises demand for non-oil sectors traded
goods and bids up their relative prices.
In the case of Azerbaijan, the following additionally apply:
4. Productivity of the non-oil traded sectors is expected to rise as a
result of a rise in capital investment
5. Productivity of the non-tradable sector is expected to rise through
an expected rise in permanent income, already being evidenced
in spillovers into sectors such as services and construction.23
6. A rise in the price of non-tradables relative to tradables.
The real effective exchange rate has appreciated by approximately 17 per cent
since 1992 to 1997. Both the nominal and real values of the manat are ex-
pected to rise, particularly as the flow of oil-exports and associated revenues
rise from 2001. It is assumed that this will raise the pressure on the manat,
with a further upward pressure expected in 2005. The real effective value of
the manat is expected to rise by 15 per cent to 2001 from 1997, by 55 per cent
to 2005 and by 150 per cent in 2010. These estimations, although indicative
and based on assumptions and expectations on future domestic and world
inflation, do highlight the importance of the exchange rate on the competitive-
ness of the non-oil Azeri tradable sector beyond the short-run period of 2–4
years.Institute for Economies in Transition                      32
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The Azeri authorities employed the nominal exchange rate since 1995 as
an anchor to reduce inflation. The policy of how to manage rising demand for
the nominal currency gave way in 1998 to the question of devaluing the cur-
rent exchange rate. In particular, the dual external shocks of a decline in the
price of oil and the onset of the Russian financial crisis and RUR devaluation
worsened the position on the current account. The ANB used hard currency
reserves to defend the manat parity during 1998, and with only partial rise in
net domestic assets, the approximately 20per cent decline in reserve money
was mirrored by a larger decline of almost 35per cent in net international
reserves.
It is therefore likely that Azerbaijan will undergo an adjustment in the
exchange rate regime with some devaluation in the short run. With a continued
tight monetary stance, the adjustment will be credible and correct the current
external sector disequlibria. Nonetheless, the medium- to long-term policy is-
sue remains.
The rising real value of the manat is not expected to be a threat to the real
sector and to competitiveness in the short-term given the following factors:
1. The starting point for a rise in the real rate for the manat is from
a low base. In particular, dollar wages of approximately USD 35
per month according to official data and of USD 115 once ben
efits such as free housing are incorporated, imply that labour
costs will remain low by international standards even were there
to be a rise of say 15 per cent.
2. Unit labour costs are distorted to the extent of over-employment.
Discounting the excess labour hoarded by enterprises will lead to
a rise in the value added per worker and thus a rise in productiv
ity. Indeed, despite the nominal rise of the manat, relative unit
labour costs in Azerbaijan are in 1998 only marginally higher
than of trading partners.
3. Exports of both goods and factor services continue to rise, sug
gesting that the current exchange rate strengthening and the im
plied loss in competitiveness is not a major policy concern at
present. A caveat is that the present volatility in financial markets
and real sectors in emerging markets may result in considerable
devaluation by countries which are competitors to Azerbaijan inInstitute for Economies in Transition                      33
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the tradable sector, and which would dampen projections for
growth of non-oil exports and; as a consequence of a decline in
world output, on oil revenues.
4. Barter trade, although declining annually accounted for 13 per
cent of total exports and 11 per cent of total imports in 1997.
Barter trade is prevalent in the CIS given the lack of liquidity
amongst economic entities and the lack of well-functioning pay
ment and settlement systems. Following the contagion of the re
cent financial crisis in emerging markets that has also impacted
transition countries, in particular Russia and Ukraine, the barter
competent may in fact rise, given the decline in wealth of trade
operators working through banking systems. The relevance here
is that barter trade is invariant to standard economic interpreta
tions of the real exchange rate and the impact on the trade-sector.
5. Official trade statistics do not fully reflect economic activity or
trade. A substantial amount of trade is shuttle-trade, with import
of consumer goods for CIS markets. This trade is in the main
dollar-based, and is also invariant to possible appreciation of the
manat.
The medium- to long-term position depends greatly on the extent to which
the oil sector fulfils expectations and the timing of revenue flows. Current
projections for the level of oil production and the related inflow of oil-based
FDI and revenues to the state represent one optimistic case from a range of
alternative scenarios. A lower inflow of monies will result in a reduced de-
mand for the manat and a decrease in the real overvaluation.
It is argued by Azeri officials, that the inherited industrial structure, with a
chain of industries of petrochemical, light and heavy industries all based on the
oil industry implies that the real exchange-rate issue is in some sense over-
blown and not a policy-issue for the Azerbaijani economy.24 However, even if
the inherited industrial base is not subject to substantial restructuring and clo-
sure of non-competitive industries, a large inflow of oil-related revenue will
impose pressures on the real sector, and the “Dutch disease” will take more
pronounced policy impact.Institute for Economies in Transition                      34
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The appreciation of the real exchange rate in the medium- to long-term
suggested by forecasts indicates that the tradable-mix may change. In par-
ticular, productivity growth in the non-oil tradable sector will be lower than
that in the oil sector. This therefore highlights the policy-implication that the
non-oil tradable sector requires sustainable transformation in order to raise
productivity sufficiently to compensate for the expected real exchange rate
rise. If necessary reforms including institutional reforms are not carried out in
the period before the expected rise in the rate of change in the appreciation of
the real exchange rate, then there is a danger that the real non-oil sector will
compress further.
An indirect impact will be the trend toward wage differentiation between
the oil and oil-related sectors and the other sectors of the economy. Higher
wages in the oil sector, coupled with the growth in the sectors of construction
and services in the Baku region may lead to regional migration, with workers
attracted from rural areas in search of higher wages. Strategic industrial policy
will therefore need to take account of the regional mix in assessing the impact
of the growth in oil-income on the non-oil sectors and upon investment.
A further indirect impact expected will be through a change in consump-
tion. The strong manat and rising net wealth of the country will push up
imports of consumer goods, further compressing the potential recovery of
domestic light industry, unless the latter is sufficiently restructured within the
next few years. The economic logic is that the rise in real wealth leads to a
faster rise in consumption of tradables than in the production of tradables,
thus leading to widening of the sectoral trade balance.
In sum, the RER for Azerbaijan is expected to rise over the medium- to
long-term, although it may not be a perceived policy-concern at present be-
cause of existing under-valuation of the RER and evident lack of impact on
other industrial sectors. The expected rising trend of RERs for all transition
country is in the case of Azerbaijan reinforced by the impact of the above
three resource-related factors specific to the country, particularly given the
persistence of sticky goods prices and flexible asset prices.25
3.2 Issues in Public Finance
The Azeri government has agreed a medium term outlook for the external
account with the IMF. The outlook is highly leveraged on expectations of an
inflow of monies into Azerbaijan based either on development or productionInstitute for Economies in Transition                      35
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and sale of oil. Following signatures with consortia of oil-companies on pro-
duction sharing, it is expected that oil exports will double between 1997 and
2000 and then rise by a factor of 5 in the following five years to 2005.
Simultaneously, the share of oil revenues accruing to foreign oil compa-
nies is expected to decline and the share for the state rise in 2003. The external
current account deficit is expected therefore to worsen, from 22 per cent of
GDP in 1997 to 35 per cent in 2000, but then recover to a balance in 2005.
The first question is the vulnerability of an economy depending on vol-
umes and prices of only one or few strategically central products (oil and gas),
particularly in cases they are small and open economies. The second elusive
factor is the price the oil price. In summer 1997 the price of Caspian oil was
around 20 US dollar per barrel, since then it has dropped to USD 10 dollar per
barrel or less. This reduced the revenues of the Azerbaijan oil-company SOCAR
and also the state budget revenues. These may in fact persuade the oil consor-
tia to reduce or even suspend their plans.
Indeed, by end of 1998, none of the 12 foreign consortia conducting ex-
ploration in Azerbaijan had discovered oil in large quantities and 2 suspended
activity in January 1999. Partners of the Caspian International Petroleum Com-
pany (CIPCO) have already drilled two exploratory wells in the offshore
Karabakh field. SOCAR, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company is pressing the
consortium to continue exploring a third field. Another consortium, the North
Absheron Operation Company  (NAOC) has too found little oil though greater
gas reserves. Another 7-member consortium led by BP and Statoil of Norway
are now drilling another field, Shah Deniz and results are expected in early
1999.26
Production of gas represents a partial solution in the future to lower oil
findings, although current production-sharing agreements are at present only
oil-based, and an infrastructure for export of gas would need to be created.
SOCAR estimates oil reserves at 30bn barrels whilst independent analysts put
the figure at 15–20bn barrels. Recoverable reserves of fields currently in pro-
duction are some 2.6bn barrels.
The policy implications relate to the possible incorrect policy choice today
based on a benign scenario of oil prices and development of new fields. A
reduction in oil production would imply lower future oil-based earnings. A
lower stream of oil earnings would impact plans for investment of oil-revenues
into the non-oil sector.Institute for Economies in Transition                      36
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Low oil prices in 1998 have led to lower export of crude oil and lower
revenue to the budget. Since Azerbaijan produces only a small part of the
world oil supply, it is a price-taker, and can not influence the price through
changes in supply. Azeri officials now recognise this fact. One option which
policy-makers might consider to insure themselves against deviations in the
price of oil is the use of oil-derivatives. Mexico for instance, successfully
insured against a drop in the price of oil in the early 1980s. Tatarstan has
recently made use of these financial instruments.
At present, Azerbaijan has signed 12 agreements, representing USD 50bn
in foreign investment. The stock of FDI totals USD 7bn to 1998 and the flow
of FDI USD 1.2 bn in 1997 alone.
One key issue for good and sustainable economic policy is how to dis-
seminate the inflow of oil revenues, particularly beyond 2000 when oil exports
are expected to grow sharply and 2003 when the share of oil revenue accruing
to foreign oil companies from the recovery of their investment costs is ex-
pected to decline.
From a fiscal stance, this implies that the overall state budget will be in
surplus on the back of the expected inflow, although policy-makers would be
advised to undertake sensitivity analysis to analyse the impact of alternative
scenarios.
How will these surpluses be used? Possible options would include reduc-
ing state liabilities through repayment of debt, capital investment – particularly
of infrastructure such the roads, railway, seaports and telecommunications.
There is a lack of a clear strategy on this question, and which needs to be
addressed now, in order to create the appropriate institutional structures to
analyse the issue and to put in place by the time the budget surplus appears or
to securitise cash-flows through mortgaging the future flow of oil revenue to
the state. This would allow Azerbaijan to borrow money in order to begin
investment in the short-run but mean debt-repayment in the longer run.
The use of the oil-premium to invest in infrastructure development would
do much to improve the efficiency of the Azeri economy and create the condi-
tions for higher endogenous growth, which depends on supply side policies to
improve efficiency generally. The policy would therefore allow for develop-
ment of the non-oil sector by improving its ability to compete internationally,
and also attract new sources of FDI into non-traditional sectors.
Such a policy choice and the dynamic contexts would require further as-
sessment. “Spillovers” or externalities from such a policy stance would in-
clude the further development of the service sector, thus creating the potentialInstitute for Economies in Transition                      37
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for growth in private sector employment, the development of high-tech firms
utilising the new technologies – particularly if harnessed together with incen-
tives to attract foreign firms by highlighting the advantages of investing in
Azerbaijan.
Any fiscal assessment would need to consider the impact on the tax base.
A rise in public expenditure on investment would, if associated industrial policy
is carefully executed, see a rise in revenue to the state from the associated rise
in the private sector. This assumes that the appropriate structural reforms in
the fiscal and financial sphere are carried out.
The tight fiscal stance in Azerbaijan in recent years has been achieved
through a compression in expenditures as well as recent moves to raise the
flow of revenues. The consolidated deficit in 1997 measured 1.7 per cent of
GDP. Arrears in wage and pension payments were eliminated in 1997, al-
though arrears for utilities – water and energy remain, while the stock of inter-
enterprise arrears remains at 200 per cent of GDP. The latter is effectively a
contingent fiscal liability, as the enterprises are state-owned.
A fundamental reform effort is needed to tackle inter-enterprise debt and
to introduce appropriate tools to tackle both the “flow” aspect of the problem,
which has proven in transition countries a far bigger structural issue to resolve,
than the more immediate “stock” problem evidenced by the raw nominal fig-
ure. Resolution of the debt-overhang is necessary as part of Azerbaijan’s struc-
tural adjustment programme of the industrial structure, to raise transparency
and improve incentives, as well as to reduce the potential inflationary impact
of the problem.
Medium- to long-term economic planning should in addition focus on a
direction for utilising comparative advantages in Azerbaijan in the form of a
well-trained work-force and high level of engineering and research capabili-
ties, as well as the natural geographic advantages of lying between Europe,
Asia and the Slavic republics. Fiscal measures could be developed to assist in
the longer-term aim of creating industrial parks or “green-field sites” where
the scientific potential could be harnessed, through future tax benefits for
investors for instance. Countries as diverse as Ireland, Israel and India have
successfully employed such policies in recent years.
3.3  Issues in Credit and Banking
Under a planned model, the function of a central bank is to act as an account-
ing centre – to print and allocate the necessary money to fulfil the plan; it isInstitute for Economies in Transition                      38
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dependent on the government. Prices are fixed so the link between money and
price is less visible than in a market system.
In a market system, prices are not exogenous, but fully linked to monetary
growth. Expansion of money supply beyond money demand leads to inflation-
ary pressure. Domestically, this impacts the goods markets through either higher
prices, or in the event of price controls, in the form of shortages and export of
goods to higher priced neighbouring markets. Externally, the excessive mon-
etary creation impacts the price of the domestic currency, by making it cheaper
for a given unit of a foreign currency, such as the USD.
To curb inflationary pressure, an appropriately tight monetary stance is
required. Azerbaijan has successfully stabilised its inflation rate through fol-
lowing an IMF-designed stabilisation plan. A tighter monetary policy does
however reveal the problems in the real sector. Enterprises previously able to
service debt through inflation no longer have the option – in an inflationary
environment, debtors gain at the expense of creditors since inflation wipes
away the real value of the debt; the reverse is true during a period of price-
stability. Without enforceable contracts and hard budget constraints, rises in
inter-enterprise debt, or arrears in taxes or wages are a rational real sector
response.
Moreover, a tight monetary stance implies a reduction in the emission of
money and credit. This creates liquidity problems for the real sector previ-
ously reliant on cheap and directed credit. Enterprises have reacted through
falling-back on inter-enterprise credit, through use of barter activity and ar-
rears on wages and taxes. Without functioning market-based legal mecha-
nisms in place, Azerbaijan has allowed a number of enterprises to reduce or
halt production, but not close outright.
A Looser Stance?
The reduction in the Azeri inflation rate was faster than planned. In particular,
a reduction in the issuance of reserve money by the central bank led to a faster
decline in the growth of broad money than anticipated. The higher than antici-
pated decline in money creation highlights both the cause and reaction of an
underdeveloped financial and banking sector.
Proponents outside the NBA, including the Ministry of Economy, argue
that the Azeri industrial sector is facing an excessively restrictive monetary
stance. In particular, it is argued, that the lack of long term credit to the economy
is a constraint to the long-term development of the non-oil industrial sectorInstitute for Economies in Transition                      39
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and that the central bank should therefore do more to issue such credits.
The NBA increasingly issues credits on commercial terms through auc-
tions, as part of its monetary policy. The maturity of these credits ranges from
7 days to 180 days. The latter is in line with standard international practice.
Moreover, the central bank is seeking to move towards the use of indirect
instruments of monetary policy in order to manage liquidity and set the mon-
etary and exchange rate stance.
The lack of long-term credit in the economy is due, not to the monetary
stance pursued by the central bank, but more due to lack of money creation or
lending by commercial banks. Money creation was lower than the IMF-agreed
programme, witnessed in the low broad money to narrow money ratio. In the
absence of directed credit, banks have refused to intermediate credit to ex-
pected levels. It is therefore the financial intermediation function that is ineffi-
cient. Deposit-taking banks are financial intermediaries – they collect deposits
and transfer them into loans, loans of differing maturities. In Azerbaijan, the
lack of long-term credit is due to a number of factors that impedes the banking
sector from carrying out maturity transformation of short-term credit into long
term loans.
The banking sector in Azerbaijan is small in terms of GDP with Total
Banking Assets at 11per cent of GDP, in comparison to mature economies
where the relative size is typically greater than 100per cent of GDP, or even in
countries advanced in transition such as Poland where it is over 60per cent of
GDP. The majority of loans originate from the four large banks: Agroprombank,
Prominvestbank, International Bank and the Savings Bank. With a decline in
directed credit and increasing commercialisation of the banks through audit-
ing, regulation and supervision along international best practice, why are banks
not successfully intermediating savings into investment?
Supply Side Factors
Three factors explain. On the supply side, banks are risk-averse. Lending
rates in real terms were above 20 per cent to 1998, which are extremely high.
This suggests that banks are using margins to build balance sheets, that there
are greater risk-based incentives for short-term lending for import-export op-
erations say, or for investment in financial securities than in lending for long-
term loans, a situation not unique to Azerbaijan among transition banking
systems. High rates of lending suggest that bankers see lending as highly risky.
Preference for short-term lending is therefore a consequent response. TheInstitute for Economies in Transition                      40
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policy impact is therefore to determine how to focus on the supply side struc-
tural changes in the financial sector which can reduce the risk assessment by
banks, to make it more attractive for them to lend, and for longer-term projects.
The possibility of large loans is of course limited simply because of the
low capitalisation of the banks. Currently, banks are now to raise capital to
USD 1m and to USD 5 m by 2000. The small capital base restricts banks’
ability to increase their loan books. This point highlights the fact that existing
banking structure is too large in the number of banks in existence and that
there will need to be mergers or closures, in order to leave a domestic banking
sector with a stronger capital base. Secondly, the high lending rates may also
indicate a degree of cartel among the main banks in Azerbaijan and a lack of
real competition. Opening the banking sector to foreign banks and allowing
greater ownership of domestic banks will raise both the level of sophistication
of lending teams through transfer of operational skills and also lead to down-
ward pressure on interest rates for viable projects that meet standard lending
criteria.27 At present foreign banks face obstacles in the form of approval
required to raise statutory capital, where a ceiling of 30 per cent on foreign
capital applies and in the make-up of senior bank personnel required.
A further factor that reduces the ability of banks to extend their loan books
is the low level of existing deposits in the banking sector. This is partly a
function of the transition in the economy and the banking problems since
1991, both in Azerbaijan and those in Russia, which has reduced confidence
in the banking system.28 Economic stabilisation coupled with the strong per-
formance of the Manat is improving the incentives for savings into the banking
sector. A related problem is the level of dollarisation in the economy, both
officially measured – the percentage of foreign exchange deposits in the bank-
ing sector and the unmeasured amount held outside the banking sector. Im-
provements in payment and settlement systems and a reduction in barter trade,
improvement in the taxation of income and in the collection of in particular
customs, are structural reforms which will help to reduce the incentive to hide
undeclared or illegal earnings and internalise transactions through new finan-
cial channels that reduce transaction costs for participants, as well as making
compliance more forthcoming. One factor specific to Azerbaijan is access by
tax inspectors to information on bank accounts. In an environment where the
tax Inspectorate is recognised as being prominent in rent-seeking activity, there
is an incentive for economic agents to work outside the official banking sys-
tem in a form of “shadow banking”.Institute for Economies in Transition                      41
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Thirdly, the risk premium attached to lending is made high due to the lack
of fully functioning legal and property rights. A law on bankruptcy was passed
in 1997. However, it is not effective because it is not being implemented.
There has not been a single bankruptcy registered in Azerbaijan. Without
rights to foreclose debtors, a bank would be taking a huge risk in providing
long-term credit. In part, the passage of other reforms such as land privatisa-
tion and registration of titles to property may allow banks to lend against
security.
Accounting procedures remain to be reformed. Whilst all the major banks
are now audited by internationally reputable accounting firms, reforms to im-
prove the accounting for borrowers lags. Improvement in presenting a full set
of accounts showing the full balance sheets with all assets and liabilities as well
as Profit and Loss Accounts would improve the ability of loan officers at
banks to better assess the quality of loan proposals and the value of collateral.
Demand Factors
When real loan rates are high, the quality of proposals put forward by borrow-
ers declines. In economic parlance, there is “adverse selection” – only high-
risk proposals are put forward.
Who are borrowers at present? Demand for long-term loans comes from
the existing or reformed enterprises in the public sector, from the privatised
SME and from new start-ups. All other things equal, the larger enterprises
should expect to pay lower rates of interest for loans because of their existing
history, larger scale production and the larger security they possess.
The implementation of legal and property rights has already been covered
in the supply side factors and applies equally here.
For improving the financial flow for the real economy, what can the gov-
ernment do? The use of government guarantees is a tool that may be utilised,
both complete or partial. In developed economies, the use of partial guaran-
tees for small-sector and start-up ventures are used and could be utilised in
Azerbaijan. The strategy may be amended with time as transition unfolds and
firms are able to self-finance without need of extra guarantees.
A major policy issue is how to direct lending to the agricultural sector and
to rural areas in general. Here the relevance is that a holistic long-term indus-
trial strategy needs to consider how to channel finance to the agricultural sec-
tor. Agroprombank represents the existing channel for provision of finance to
farmers and the existence of both its branch network and that of IndustrialInstitute for Economies in Transition                      42
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bank may provide an avenue for providing credit. However, given the devel-
opment stage of banking in Azerbaijan and the problems highlighted already, it
is unlikely that more than a trickle of commercial bank credit will flow to
agriculture in the short-run.
The current position of agriculture is in flux. Privatisation of farms is
under way. The implementation of land law will allow farmers to borrow on
secured terms, and there will then be a commercial basis for banks to open
credit lines to farmers, both for purchase of seeds and inputs and for working
capital. The state could in addition assist by assisting in the development of
leasing facilities for agriculture, ideally with the participation of the private
sector and/or international bodies. The strategy could be complemented by a
shorter-run solution of the set-up of a micro-lending unit or bank typically
found in developing countries, in order to provide small loans that are outside
the scope of existing domestic commercial banks.
4 Conclusions
The first part of the paper outlines current economic developments in
Azerbaijan. Data on the real economy and industry are analysed and dis-
cussed. The decline in real GDP and production was 50 per cent of the level in
1991 to 1995 but that the rise in the nascent private sector is not fully re-
flected in official statistics, and may represent as much as 60 per cent of
GDP, thus over-representing the recorded decline.
The Azeri government has pursued, almost to the letter, the IMF-led
stabilisation package since 1995. This has led to a rapid decline in inflation to
single digit annual inflation and resumption of economic growth, measuring 6
per cent in 1997 and expected 8 per cent for 1998. The Azeri economic
structure within the USSR was based around the utilisation of energy re-
sources located in Azerbaijan, with heavy industry such as electro-energy,
chemicals and metallurgy and light industry such as textiles and food-process-
ing representing downstream industrial use. Other sectors such as Agriculture,
although outside the oil-based complex, benefited from subsidised energy in-
puts. Although the oil sector remains the main engine of economic growth,
there were signs of a broadening of the recovery, with increases in output in
agriculture, services and industry, though recently non-oil activity appears to
be slowing again. In the oil sector, exports of crude oil from the new fields
began in November 1997 and have risen more rapidly than expected, andInstitute for Economies in Transition                      43
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seven new oil exploration contracts with foreign consortia were concluded
during 1998. Foreign direct investment has amounted to US$1.8 billion in
1998 (nearly USD150 per capita), about one quarter of which went to the
non-oil sector and the stock of total FDI to 1998 is approxately USD 4bn.
The next stage of reforms represents structural adjustment beyond
stabilisation. Significant steps have been achieved in the liberalisation of the
liberalisation of prices and of the trade regime. Privatisation of the small-scale
sector is complete. However, while reforms of the banking structure and sup-
porting laws on bankruptcy have been pursued, progress has been slow. Moreo-
ver, public finance reform is still on the agenda – a new Tax Code is ear-
marked for passage in 1999, while the expenditure function is being made
more accountable and transparent through the introduction of a treasury sys-
tem. On the Revenue side, a properly trained and accountable Tax Inspector-
ate is lacking, whilst the lack of independence of the judiciary is proving to be
a source of rent-seeking activities.
The relative abundance of oil and, in future, of gas represent natural ad-
vantages for achieving sustainable and equitable economic growth for Azerbaijan
into the 21st century. However, as discussed in the second part of the paper,
this abundance needs to be managed with care. Nigeria and Norway represent
two alternatives to where oil-intensity can lead for an economy. In particular,
the issues raised include the problems related to the “Dutch disease” syn-
drome, which can lead to problems of competitiveness for the non-oil tradable
sector, and to crowding out of resources in favour of non-tradables. Related
issues include how to manage the increase in expected wealth from the oil-
premium to attain fiscal smoothing, and structural reforms in the banking sphere
to kick-start the thus-far lacking intermediating process.
The expected in-flow of oil revenues will lead to both internal and external
surpluses, particularly after 2005. This is expected to lead to a strengthening
of the manat and a worsening position of the tradable sector. Whilst not a
policy concern at present, the real exchange rate is expected to rise from 2003
and so will represent a medium-term policy issue. Possible policy responses
include maintaining offshore oil earnings as in the Kuwaiti case or in the form
of an Investment Trust as undertaken by Norway. Supporting second genera-
tion reforms in the fiscal area in addition to better fiscal governance and im-
proved tax collection, as well as preparations to manage surpluses from the
“oil premium”, and which need to be developed in advance. The non-oil in-
dustry employs the majority of the labour force. Intermediating savings into
investment potential, outside direct FDI requires banking sector reforms, andInstitute for Economies in Transition                      44
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has regional policy implications. The development of microcredit facilities for
Agriculture represents a possible low-cost solutions to providing credit to rural
farms, where commercial banks may not otherwise venture for many years.
Azerbaijan has successfully steered through the first generation of reforms.
The focus is now upon second generation reforms.Institute for Economies in Transition                      45
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Notes
1 The authors have acted as advisors to governments in Azerbaijan and other CIS
republics. Mr Singh is a member of CETRAN, Centre for Economies in Transition
at Independente Universidade, Lisbon, Portugal and was a visiting researcher at the
Bank of Finland. Mr Laurila is a senior advisor at BOFIT.
2 The present article is the second of two articles focussing upon Azerbaijan. A
complementary first paper by Juhani Laurila at BOFIT presents the reader with a
historical background to the geo-political background adjunct to the economic is-
sues. This article has come out in series entitled BOFIT Online.
3 Laurila (1999, forthcoming), BOFIT, Power Politics and Oil as Determinants of
Transition: the case of Azerbaijan. The paper concludes that co-operation and
partnership created through liberalised and free markets and commercialisation
pushing aside the ethnical and religious conflicts, isolation and territorial demands,
can be seen as a part of transitional process. Moreover, it is argued in that the oil-
driven transition, if successfully implemented in Azerbaijan, is likely to increase the
political stability in the Caspian region and Caucasus, through internationalising
commercial activity related to the energy sector.
4  As a counterpart for “Northern Caucasus” containing Dagestan, Chechnya, North-
ern-Ossetiya, Gabardino–Balkariya and Karabayevo–Chercessya, “Southern Cau-
casus herein refers to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and to the Russian notion
“Transcaucasia” (“Zakavkazye”) which refers to land mass south of Caucasus moun-
tain ridge as seen from northern (from Russian) perspective.
5 Recent work on Azerbaijan includes Altstadt (1992), The Azerbaijani Turks and
Dawisha K and B Parrott (1997), Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia
and the Caucasus and which focus in general on geopolitical analysis.
6 de Melo (1996) defines three aspects of liberalization: (i) internal liberalization,
or price liberalization an abolition of state monopolies (ii) external liberalization,
or liberalization of the foreign trade regime; and, (iii) private sector entry, small
and large scale privatization. See Singh, (1999, forthcoming) BOFIT, Transition
and Transit to a Market Setting: A Model Guide, for development of this defini-
tion where liberalization as defined here and stabilisation together define first gen-
eration reforms and where structural reforms represent second generation reforms
in the transition process.
7 Up to 60per cent of GDP is estimated (e.g. EBRD Transition Reports) to be not
recorded.Institute for Economies in Transition                      48
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8 Based on 1990, recorded real wages declined by 86 per cent  in 1995. By 1997 the
decline was 75 per cent, following the onset of growth. The recorded statistics do not
capture the large shadow economy and therefore over-report the decline by as much
as 35 – 40 per cent.
9 The period was marked by the Nagorno–Karabakh war, which led to the loss of 20
per cent of the Azerbaijani territory. However, according to the Azeri government,
the region was responsible for a very small share of pre-conflict GDP and the loss
thereof did not therefore deprive Azerbaijan of significant GDP. Nevertheless, the
agricultural potential of the lost territory and the cost of providing housing and
supporting displaced persons has undoubtedly (i) raised both the level and compo-
sition of expenditures, (ii) reduced the potential growth of the holiday service sec-
tor since the majority of these buildings are used to house displaced persons and
(iii) reduced potential GDP.
10 Singh (1999), op.cit.
11 The possibility of deploying micro-credit structures is an option, and briefly dis-
cussed in Section II, (iii).
12 This echoes the argument made in Laurila (1999), op cit. about economic and
commercial interests overcoming non-economic hostilities and providing a bridge
toward solutions in non-economic areas.
13 Tornell A and Lane P (1998) blame the “voracity effect” for boom and bust fiscal
responses in resource-rich economies, particularly against the background of a
fragmented society and competing power blocs.
14 Natik Aliyev, President of SOCAR, in Daily Monitor, 18 August 1998, p. 6.
15 Singh (1999), op cit. argues that sustainable economic growth beyond first gen-
eration reforms requires institutional reform, which can be regarded as a catalyst
for move toward “good” or sustainable and equitable economic growth. See also
Barro (1994) where the link with growth and democracy are found, and Valdivieso
(1998) who links the success of sustainable reform and therefore growth on the
starting conditions of a country.
16 For instance, The UNDP Human Development Report on Azerbaijan (1997).
17 The unemployment rate in Azerbaijan is artificially low as firms closed nomi-
nally continue to have labour on their books in order to qualify for present or fu-
ture social benefits, whilst the labour force itself has shrunk due to the low level of
minimum benefits though on the other hand a significant minority of women, also
not registered, are working in the informal trade and service sector.
18 These issues are addressed more completely in Laurila J (1999, ii).Institute for Economies in Transition                      49
Rupinder Singh – Juhani  Laurila
BOFIT Discussion Papers  5/1999
 Azerbaijan: Recent Economic Developments and Policy Issues in Sustainability of Growth
19 The Dutch Disease syndrome relates to a situation in which fast growth of a
resource-based economic sector impacts negatively other real sectors through a
rise in the real exchange rate and crowding out of resources.
20 Controls on the Capital account á la Chile and China represent possible medium-
term policy instruments as part of a sequenced reform agenda.
21 See for instance Eastwood, RK and AJ Venebles, 1982 and Buiter W and DD
Purvis (1983) for models.
22 Halpern L and C Wyplosz (1996) and Krajnyák K and J Zettelmeyer (1997).
23 A rise in the equilibrium real exchange rate corresponds to a situation of produc-
tivity in the tradable sector is greater than that in the non-tradable sector, viz. the
Balassa/Samuelson condition.
24 See footnote 1.
25 The same factors are likely to apply to other resource-endowed transition coun-
tries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
26 See Laurila (1999), op cit for further description on the oil consortia.
27 The experience from other transition countries, such as Estonia, where foreign
entry has been forthcoming is that there are other positive spillovers. Foreign banks
bring more conservatism to operations and better governance, and reduce regulatory
risk for bank regulators with limited supervisory capacity by being responsible also
to home country regulators in mature market economies. For universal banks and
proliferation of financial subsidiaries in other financial markets such as for securities
and insurance, greater prudence and better governance has extended to these mar-
kets where regulation and supervision in transition countries lags bank regulation.
28 TV media in particular is very much Moscow-based, particularly for news. Thus
confidence in banking in Azerbaijan is very much affected by the coverage of fi-
nancial and banking crises in Russia.BOFIT Discussion Papers
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